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Abstract:  This working paper examines social security increases in Ireland as a case 
study of the existence of political budget cycles in European countries. Ireland is an 
appropriate country to examine, first because it has a system of proportional 
representation and  some studies suggest that proportional electoral systems are 
associated with expansions of welfare spending both before and after elections. Second, it 
is generally recognised that Irish political parties occupy the middle ground in terms of 
political ideology. Again studies would suggest that an absence of a strong ideological 
commitment to particular policies may make political budget cycles more likely.  
Utilising the distinctive nature of the public expenditure process in relation to welfare 
budget increases, this paper examines the issue of whether or not a political budget cycle 
can be seen in Ireland in relation to social security expenditure. It draws a number of 
conclusions as to the existence and incidence of political budget cycles in an Irish context 
and also looks at whether political budget cycles have succeeded in their apparent 
objective i.e. securing election for the relevant political party.   
 
There has been considerable academic debate and research about the existence of 
political budget cycles.  A political budget cycle can be defined as a periodic fluctuation 
in the government's fiscal policies, which is induced by the cyclicality of elections (Shi 
and Svensson, 2003). Much of the research has focused on quantitative studies of a 
relatively large number of countries.  While there have been a number of more specific 
studies particularly in Latin America, there are relatively few studies in an European 
context and, in particular, few national studies. This paper takes the case of social 
security spending in the Republic of Ireland (hereafter Ireland) as a case study in relation 
to the existence of political budget cycles in developed countries. Ireland is an 
appropriate country to examine, first because it has a system of proportional 
representation and  some studies suggest that proportional electoral systems are 
associated with expansions of welfare spending both before and after elections (Persson 
and Tabellini, 2002). Second, it is generally recognised that Irish political parties occupy 
the middle ground in terms of political ideology. Again studies would suggest that an 
absence of a strong ideological commitment to particular policies may make political 
budget cycles more likely (Persson and Tabellini, 1990). This paper examines the issue of 
whether or not a political budget cycle can be seen in Ireland in relation to social security  
budget increases.     
 
The first section of this paper reviews the extensive literature in this area.  The second 
section  outlines the methodology and approach to this study of the social security (or 
social welfare as it is known) budget increases in Ireland.  The subsequent section 
presents and analyses the evidence while the final section 4 concludes and summarises 
the findings. 
  
Literature review 
 
The literature on political budget cycles is an offshoot of the broader debate about the 
existence of a political business cycle.  This studies the effect of politics and in particular 
elections, on the economy looking, for example, at their impact on GDP growth and 
unemployment (Shi and Svensson, 2003). In general, the notion that a country's economic 
performance could be influenced by political cycles received little academic support not 
least because of the limited ability of politicians to manipulate the economy (Remmer, 
1993; Drazen, 2001; Shi and Svensson, 2003).  Accordingly, research has tended to focus 
more narrowly on political budget cycles looking at those policy instruments directly 
within the control of government (such as fiscal policy and government spending).  The 
basic rationale behind the political budget cycle literature is that governments will 
manipulate fiscal and expenditure policy, in part, in order to obtain electoral success. 
 
There are a number of competing theories as to why such manipulation might be 
acceptable to voters-some of them relying on the assumption that voters are non-rational.  
One of the more credible rationales has been put forward by a Persson and Tabellini 
(1990).  They argue that governments are primarily interested in securing re-election 
rather than in implementing ideological policies.  They also assume that voters are 
rational but are unaware of the competence of the political contenders (where 
competence is defined as efficiency in the provision of public services).  Given that 
voters prefer competent governments, rational voters will interpret a pre-electoral 
spending boom as a device signalling competence. However, as Kraemer (1997) points 
out, while this model can serve as a useful starting point, the distinction between 
competent and incompetent governments is much more blurred in the real world.  Voters 
will find it difficult to distinguish between competent and incompetent governments and 
an incompetent government will, of course, tend to mimic the behaviour of a competent 
one and expand spending where elections are expected.  This highlights the point that it is 
not simply the policy measures adopted by a government which are important.  Rather 
voters will also take into account the political capital of the government, the manner in 
which its proposals are presented and the credibility of the criticisms and alternative 
proposals advanced by the opposition.1 As will be discussed in more detail below, social 
security spending is particularly relevant in this context as it is arguably a clear manner in 
which a governing party can show its competence. 
 
A number of studies have indeed found evidence of political budget cycles.  Alesina, 
Cohen and Roubini (1991), looking at a sample of 18 OECD countries, found evidence of 
expansionary monetary policy in election years and also indications of loose fiscal policy 
prior to elections.  In a study of 60 democratic countries in the period from 1960-1998, 
Persson and Tabellini (2002) found that taxes were cut before elections and painful fiscal 
adjustments were postponed until after elections (although they found no evidence of a 
                                                
1 This process was well illustrated in the run-up to the Irish 2002 and 2007 general elections (Gallagher et 
al., 2003)). In earlier work Harrison and Marsh (1998) found that economic performance set the general 
level of government approval but did not affect more short-term fluctuations. 
welfare state spending cycle).2  Of particular interest in an Irish context, Persson and 
Tabellini (2002) found that majoritarian electoral rules were associated with pre-electoral 
spending cuts while proportional electoral systems were associated with expansions of 
welfare spending both before and after elections. However, Brender and Drazen (2004) 
found both that political budget cycles generally and the relationship with proportional 
representation was confined to newly established democracies. 
 
A number of recent econometric studies have examined whether political budget cycles 
can be seen in EU countries but have come to conflicting conclusions. Focusing on taxes 
and expenditure, Andrikopoulos et al (2004) found no evidence that national 
governments of the member states of the EU manipulated the fiscal policy instruments at 
their disposal for electoral purposes.  In contrast, focusing on the general government 
balance, Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) found that fiscal balances on average deteriorated 
by about 0 .4% of GDP in general election years (controlling for other factors). Warin 
and Donahue (2006)  who examined the fiscal balance, government revenue and 
expenditure - also found evidence of a political budget cycle in the period 1979-2005 but 
argue that the Treaty of Maastricht and the constraints imposed by the Stability and 
Growth Pact have more recently constrained governments from adopting a political 
budget cycle.  Von Hagen (2003), Buti and van den Noord (2003) and Mink and de Haan 
(2005) also found evidence in support of political budget cycles in the EU but these latter 
studies were confined to a period of only four or five years.  
 
                                                
2 See also Drazen (2001); Shi and Svensson (2002a and b; 2003) 
Political budget cycles have also been found in a number of detailed studies in less 
developed countries such as Argentina,3 Brazil,4 Colombia,5 Mexico,6 Peru,7 Venezuela,8 
Korea9 and Turkey.10 However there have been relatively few country studies in Europe.  
Van Dalen and Swank (1995) examined whether opportunistic motives affected 
government expenditure growth in the Netherlands.11  Looking at the period from 1953-
1993, the authors found that, in general, government spending was affected by 
opportunistic motives.  In particular, they found that all government expenditure 
categories showed an upwards trend during election times.12 There do not appear to be 
any published studies of political budget cycles in Ireland in terms of government 
spending although there are frequent references in the political science literature to high 
levels of clientelism and (somewhat undefined) populism which would suggest that it is 
an appropriate country for study.13 
  
Methodology of the study 
 
                                                
3 Medina and Lema (2003). For a review of Latin America generally see Kraemer (1997). 
4 Bittencourt and Hilbrecht (2002). 
5 Eslava (2005). 
6 Bruhn (1996); Dion (2000); Gonzalez (2002); Yarahuan (2003); Magaloni et al.(2003). 
7 Schady (2000). 
8 Puente (2004). 
9 Kwon (2001). It is interesting to note that this study of a developmental state found strong evidence that 
the timing and distribution of public expenditure could be explained by the logic of electoral politics. 
10 Tutar and Tansel (2000); Asutay (2004). 
11 See also Akmedov and Zhuravskayas (2004) study of political cycles in Russia and Galli and Rossis 
(2002) study of cycles in German lander. 
12 The study also examined the effect of party politics but this aspect is flawed by the fact that it looks only 
at the impact of left (PvDA) and right wing (VVD) parties and effectively assumes that the Christian 
Democratic party (CDA) had no influence: a strange assumption when the CDA has been the largest party 
of government throughout the 20th century and one of the main founders of the Dutch welfare state. 
13 Amongst the numerous such references see Carty (1984), Komito (1984) and OMalley and Kerby 
(2004). 
As we have seen, most of the studies of political budget cycles involve a large number of 
countries and rely on quantitative methodologies. There are advantages and 
disadvantages to this approach. Larger scale quantitative studies can allow a wide range 
of factors to be taken into account over a considerable period of time in a large number of 
countries.  Such quantitative studies use sophisticated econometric methods to analyse 
the relationship between factors such as the level of economic development or the 
strength of particular political parties and the existence of a political budget cycle 
(variously measured).  Unfortunately, however, the availability of data and the linking of 
the data to the theory do not always match the sophistication of the econometric methods 
used and there have been a number of recent important criticisms of aspects of 
quantitative approaches (Shalev, 2002, Hall, 2003; Ebbinghaus, 2003).  In addition, as we 
have seen in the case of recent European studies, where research projects come to 
different conclusions as to the existence or otherwise of political budget cycles, it is 
difficult to penetrate the black box of the methodology to discover which finding is 
correct. 
 
Hall (2003, 373-4) argues that a substantial gap has opened up between ontology (in the 
sense of the fundamental assumptions that scholars make about the nature of the social 
and political world and especially about the nature of the causal relationships within that 
world) and methodology (the means scholars use for ensuring that their inferences about 
the social political world are valid).  Most ontologies now assume that policy outcomes 
are the result of complex interaction effects and various forms of multiple causality 
whereas many statistical methods are based on much more restrictive assumptions about 
causal relationships (e.g. independence of variables, steady impact over time and space, 
absence of multiple causality).  This is not to deny the value of statistical methods. 
However, it is to insist on the importance of inspecting not only the correspondence 
between the data representing causes and those representing outcomes but also the 
process whereby those causal factors operate so as to lead to those outcomes (Hall, 2003).  
As Hall (2003) argues the essence of explanation does not simply lie in specifying a set 
of explanatory variables, particular levels of which can be said to correlate with an 
outcome, but in explaining the mechanisms whereby one factor leads to another.  This 
study adopts an alternative, more qualitative, approach looking in detail at one particular 
country. 
 
Many studies use total government expenditure as the dependent variable when 
examining the existence of a political budget cycle.  This approach suffers from the 
disadvantage that many aspects of government spending may not be particularly effective 
(or may even be counter effective) in terms of the supposed aims of the political budget 
cycle.  One might expect, therefore, that a political budget cycle would lead to changes in 
the composition of rather than (or as well as) the size of the budget (see, for example, 
Eslava, 2005). Perhaps for these reasons, other studies confine themselves to an 
examination of welfare state spending.  This still suffers from the disadvantage, which 
also applies to the study of overall government expenditure, that changes in spending are 
affected by a wide range of factors other than government policy.  The ageing of the 
population, for example, in the absence of any change in public policy, will lead to 
increased spending on the old-age pensions.  Similarly, a rise in unemployment will, 
absent policy change, lead to an increase in spending on unemployment.  Thus, in using 
total expenditure (either overall government expenditure or total welfare state 
expenditure) it is necessary to control for such factors.  This is not unproblematic and 
gives rise to questions as to whether the ultimate findings of such studies are correct or 
simply the result of inadequately controlling for other factors. 
 
In this study we will look at increases in social welfare expenditure.14 A focus on social 
security expenditure appears particularly appropriate in examining whether or not 
political budget cycles exist.  Social security expenditure constitutes a significant 
proportion of total government expenditure in Ireland (over 25 per cent. of current 
expenditure).  In addition, the vast bulk of the expenditure goes directly to a large number 
of voters rather than being absorbed in administration costs.  Thirdly, improvements in 
the social security area are quickly apparent without the lead time often necessary in 
other policy areas such as health or education. 
 
In the Irish context, the particular structure of the Irish budgetary process provides an 
alternative source of data which helps to avoid issues of controlling for non-policy related 
changes in government spending.  For largely historical reasons, increases in social 
security spending in Ireland normally involve a two-stage process.  First, some weeks 
before the budget, increases due to demographic and labour market changes are 
announced in the Estimates.  These aim to provide the necessary resources to fund the 
existing level of benefits in the following financial year on what has become known as a 
                                                
14 In the Irish context, social welfare expenditure includes all classic social security schemes such as 
unemployment, disability, old age and family benefits but does not include health services. I use the terms 
social security and social welfare interchangeably in this paper. 
no policy change basis, i.e. having regard to likely changes in the number of claimants 
but making no allowance for increases in benefit rates, improvements in schemes nor the 
introduction of new benefits.  In contrast, in the area of other social services such as 
health and education, the Estimates normally make provision for improvement in services 
in the coming year.15 Second, on Budget day, the Minister for Finance announces what 
has become known as the social welfare budget package, i.e. a specific amount of 
money provided for increases in rates, improvements in existing schemes, or the 
introduction of new schemes.  This is now a longstanding practice.  It first appears -in an 
Irish context- in the first Fianna Fáil budget of 1932 albeit that there is an element of 
inconsistency in following decades as to whether funding will appear in the Estimates or 
in the Budget.16 However, since 1960 there has been a consistent pattern of announcing a 
sum in the budget for social security improvements (known hereafter as the social 
welfare budget package although the term itself appears to be of more recent origin). 
 
Given the basic objective underlined the political budget cycle approach, i.e. to 
encourage voters to vote for the relevant political party, the social welfare budget 
package appears a very useful indicator of whether or not a political budget cycle exists.  
The general assumption is that-in most political contexts-governments will receive little 
credit for simply ensuring that existing (or future) claimants receive the benefits already 
provided for them. Rather-at least in an Irish context-there is a longstanding expectation 
                                                
15 Of course, in some cases, the Estimates may also provide for reductions (cutbacks) in certain services as 
in the 2004 social welfare estimates.  This, however, is the exception rather than the rule and such 
reductions tend to be of a relatively minor nature in the context of the overall estimates. There are a number 
of exceptions to this when cutbacks were quite significant such as in 1987. 
16  For example, funding for the introduction of unemployment assistance in 1934 was provided in the 
Estimates rather than in the Budget.    
amongst voters that governments will attempt to ensure that benefits are improved or at 
the very least that they do not disimprove in real terms.  A focus on the social welfare 
budget package allows this aspect of government policy to be analysed disregarding 
existing commitments without having to introduce complex methods of statistical 
control. 
 
The social welfare budget package is, of course, not a perfect measure.  First, the social 
welfare budget package only relates to the cost of improvements in the current financial 
year and in the following full financial year.17 The longer-term impact of significant 
increases is subsumed into the Estimates after the first year.  In addition, there are issues 
of the data comparability over the long-term examined in this study.  While, in recent 
years, data are available for both the current and full year costs, in many cases only the 
current year cost is given in earlier budgets.18 For this reason the analysis in the following 
section focuses primarily on periods for which comparable data are available rather than 
trying to make a comparison over the entire period. Third, one cannot simply compare the 
size of the social welfare budget package for example 1933 with that in say 2003.   
                                                
17 The "current year" cost relates to the cost of the measure in the current financial year.  The "full-year" 
cost relates to the cost in a full financial year.  Insofar as a budget measure is implemented from the start of 
the financial year, the two costs would be the same.  However, it is often the case for financial or 
administrative reasons that a new policy measure is implemented during the financial year and the cost in 
the current year is therefore less than it would be in a full financial year. The full year cost is obviously the 
more reliable measure and is used wherever possible in this study.  However, it is unfortunately the case 
that, particularly in the earlier period, the cost is often only provided on the current year basis. There is, 
however, a high degree of correlation be two series which indicates that, overall, the current year data does 
provide a reliable indicator of budgetary trends.  
18 There are almost certainly other definitional changes in how the social welfare budget package is costed 
over time.  Unfortunately the detailed method of calculation is rarely available for earlier years. 
While there are a variety of ways of controlling for the fact that the value of money 
changes over time, in this analysis we present data in relation to the budget package as a 
percentage of national income, where this is available (see appendix 1).19 
 
Identifying a political budget cycle 
How might we identify a political budget cycle?  Firstly, over the period for which 
consistent budgetary increases have been provided and for which comparable data are 
available (1960-2005) we look at the size of the social welfare budget package as a 
percentage of gross national/domestic product in pre-election budgets (i.e. the one or two 
budgets before an election), post-election budgets (the budget after an election) and non-
election budgets.  Secondly, given that we might expect that the existence of political 
budget cycles will vary over time and because some data are only comparable within 
specific time periods, we analyse in a more qualitative manner social welfare budget 
packages over specific periods.  Intuitively we might expect that the ruling party would 
provide increased social welfare budget packages in the one or two budgets before an 
election, while an opposition party (which obviously can't do this) would promise 
increased benefits in the election campaign and deliver these in the one or two budgets 
after the election (thereafter itself following the pattern of a ruling party). In this study we 
look at whether pre-or post budgets (shown as a percentage of national) are significantly 
higher than the preceding or following budgets.20 The findings are discussed in more 
detail in the following section.21   
                                                
19 Although not included in appendix 1, the analysis also looked at increases in the cost of living in the 
relevant periods.  
20 For the purposes of this analysis, we define the pre-election budget normally as the budget immediately 
before the election. Post-election budgets are taken to be the budget immediately after an election.  While a 
  
Findings of the study 
 
The trends in relation to social welfare budget packages are set out in appendix 1 and 
shown graphically in figures 1-4 (for the period from 1960).22 As can be seen there is no 
general unilinear trend in relation to the size of social security increases. Large increases 
began with the advent of Fianna Fáil governments in the early 1930s (reaching 1 per cent. 
of national income in 1934 with the introduction of unemployment assistance) but, 
subsequently, increases in the period to the 1960s tended to be quite small (with the 
exception of specific years such as 1944 (introduction of child benefit) and 1952 (unified 
social security scheme)). The size of increases rose somewhat from the mid 1960s and 
then rose dramatically during the early years of the Fine Gael-Labour coalition (1973-
77). Budget sizes peaked again in 1980-1 before falling back to more modest levels (not 
much more than 0.5% of GNP on a full year basis) until a recent peak (about 1% in full 
year terms) before the 2002 and 2007 elections.  
 
But can evidence of any political budget cycle be seen in relation to social security 
expenditure increases?  We look firstly at the overall position in the period from 1960 
when consistent and comparable data are available. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
case could be made for examining the two budgets before and after an election, in the Irish case this would 
result in almost no nonelection budgets. In a small number of cases where the parliamentary term ran for 
five years, we include two pre-election projects. 
21 A more detailed discussion of the methodology is found in appendix 1. 
22 The data (outlined in Appendix 1) is taken from the budget speeches of successive Ministers for Finance 
which are published in the Dáil debates and as separate booklets from 1958.  Data for the period 1991-2007 
was kindly provided by the Department of Social and Family Affairs.  
Insert table 1 
 
As can be seen, overall pre -election budgets do tend to be considerably larger and post-
elections budgets somewhat larger than in non-election years. However, there is very 
substantial year-on-year variation in budget sizes and the removal of the pre-election 
budgets in 1980 and 1981 would entirely remove the pre-election year advantage (as 
would the removal of the record 1973 budget affect the post-election advantage). 
Accordingly, it is necessary to look in more detail at the individual time periods. 
 
1922-57  
 Following a period of rebellion, Ireland became independent of the United Kingdom in 
1922. This was immediately followed by a split in the Sinn Féin party which led to the 
establishment of two main parties: Cumann na nGaedheal (later Fine Gael) and Fianna 
Fáil. In the initial period from 1923 to 1932, with the fiscally conservative Cumann na 
nGaedheal in power, there is no evidence of any political budget cycle.  This is 
unsurprising given that the government of the period did not generally seek support 
through social policy expenditure and, in fact, became infamous for its reduction in old 
age pension rates.23 
 
In 1932 a more radical Fianna Fáil assumed office, initially with the support of the 
Labour party. However, the initial period of Fianna Fáil rule over 16 consecutive years 
from 1932 to 1948 also does not show any sustained signs of political budget cycles.  The 
coming to power of Fianna Fáil in 1932 certainly led to a significant increase in social 
                                                
23 See, for example, Cousins (2003). 
expenditure but this, in fact, took place mainly in the years immediately following the 
1932 and the surprise 1933 election and spending dropped significantly coming up to the 
1937 and 1938 elections (appendix 1) .  Nor is there any sign of a political budget cycle 
in relation to the 1943 election-a finding supported by a broader analysis of the politics of 
that election (Lee, 1985).  However, there are indications that Fianna Fáil put much more 
emphasis on social policy measures in the 1944 election, in particular, the introduction of 
the children's allowance scheme and spending of over £2 million pounds was provided 
for the introduction of that scheme in a full year.  However, despite significant increases 
in overall expenditure in the post-war years, there is in no sign of a political budget cycle 
in the subsequent 1948 election. 
 
The 1948-57 period was one of political instability.  An Inter-party government replaced 
Fianna Fáil in office in 1948 and itself fell following internal dissension in 1951.  Fianna 
Fáil returned to office until 1954 when it was replaced by the second Inter-party 
government. There is little indication of a political budget cycle in this period.  Spending 
increases in the social security area were quite modest and in many years no specific 
additional provision was made for improvements in benefits.  The major improvement in 
this period was the introduction of a comprehensive social security scheme eventually 
introduced by Fianna Fáil in 1952-3.  Significant spending increases were provided for 
this, firstly by the Inter-party government in 1951 and, secondly, by Fianna Fáil in 1952.  
However, while party political factors clearly played a role in the introduction of this 
scheme, the specific timing of its introduction does not appear to be related to a political 
budget cycle. Indeed, although it marked a significant increase in welfare spending, the 
1952 budget was widely seen as extremely harsh and included the scrapping of food 
subsidies (albeit with the provision of some additional compensation through the social 
security system) (see Bew and Patterson,1982, 65). 
 
1957-72 
This period covers the second era of Fianna Fáil hegemony. This is the first period for 
which increases are a consistently provided on an annual basis (from 1960).  As set out in 
table 1, expenditure increases provided, while quite modest compared to the 1930s or 
later periods, were significantly higher in the pre and post-election budgets than in non-
election years. However, any significant political budget cycle effect in this period 
appears to be confined to the 1969 and 1973 elections.24  And even here the very modest 
nature of the effect  compared to the post-1973 increases  must be emphasised.  
 
Insert figure 1 
 
1973-86 
This was a second period of political instability.  A coalition government of Fine Gael 
and Labour took office in 1973 but was replaced by Fianna Fáil in the 1977.  In 1981 and 
1982 there were no less than three elections.  In June 1981, a coalition government of 
Fine Gael and Labour was narrowly elected to office but resigned following the failure to 
achieve support for its budget in January 1982.  Fianna Fáil resumed office after elections 
in February 1982 but this government fell later that year and a Fine Gael-Labour coalition 
                                                
24 The budget following the 1965 election was also well above average but the pre-election budget was 
modest in the extreme and it is difficult to interpret this as evidence of a political budget cycle. 
again took office following elections in November 1982 remaining in office until 
February 1987 (although Labour withdrew from the coalition shortly before that 
election). 
 
As set out in table 1, the overall data for the period again indicate that spending in pre 
and post-election years was greater than in non-election years.  However, examination of 
the year-on-year data shows quite different patterns in different electoral periods (figure 
2).25 There is clear evidence of a political budget cycle in the 1981-82 period.  As can be 
seen in figure 2, social security budget spending increased very significantly in 1980 and 
1981 prior to the June 1981 election.  While inflation was running at a high rate at that 
time, even allowing for inflation the social welfare budget package increased very 
significantly as it also did in terms of the percentage of gross national product.  The 
coalition budget package in 1982 (which, ironically, failed to achieve parliamentary 
approval) provided an even more dramatic increase in expenditure even allowing for 
inflation and changes in GNP.26  Of course, we cannot tell how a Fine Gael-Labour 
government might have behaved in subsequent years.  Nonetheless there is clear evidence 
that the social welfare budget package was used by all the major parties in an attempt to 
secure political support at a time of instability and repeated elections. 
 
Insert figure 2 
                                                
25 The analysis here is based on current year data. However, full year data are available for about half the 
budgets and are very strongly correlated with the current year data (0.89). 
26 I have categorised this as a pre-election budget. Obviously an election was not intended at this time. 
However, given that the Fine Gael led government was in a minority position, an election must have been 
in the minds of those framing the budget. This budget, insofar as these social security aspects went, was 
substantially enacted by the Fianna Fáil government which took office later that year.  
 There is no indication of a political budget cycle in the rest of this period.  The Fine Gael-
Labour coalition did provide very significant increases in social security expenditure in 
mid-1970s dwarfing the sort of increases which had been provided by Fianna Fáil in the 
previous decade.27  However, these increases are almost countercyclical from a political 
point of view.  The largest increases were provided in the years following the 1973 
election and increases had reduced significantly by the time of the 1977 election.  
Subsequently the 1982-86 coalition also provided moderate increases which were again 
almost counter-cyclical falling in size as the election approached.28 
 
1987-2007 
This period represents the third (and ongoing) period of Fianna Fáil hegemony with 
Fianna Fáil in office (on its own or with a variety of coalition partners) for all but two and 
a half years of the period.  Again the global figures suggest a political budget cycle effect 
but mask differing trends in different elections.  As set out in table 1 pre-election 
spending is significantly higher than spending in other years but this effect is entirely 
driven by the 2002 and 2007 elections. Short-term elections occurred in both 1989 and 
1992 but there is no sign of any significant change in social security expenditure in the 
run-up to these elections (figure 3 and 4).29  The Fianna Fáil-Labour coalition, elected in 
1992, fell in late 1994 and, for the only time to date, a new Rainbow government-
                                                
27 While inflation was very high in the period, reaching 20.9 per cent. in 1975, this does not account for the 
significant increase. For example, the nominal size of the budget package increased by almost 500 per cent. 
from 1972 to 1973 at a time when inflation was 11.4 per cent. 
28 There was, in effect, no pre-election budget on this occasion as the two parties failed to agree a budget 
and elections were called: (Laver et al., 1987).  
29 The 1992 election, in particular, was unintended resulting from the withdrawal of support by the 
Progressive Democrat party for the Fianna Fail led government: Gallagher and Laver (1993). 
consisting of Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left - took office without an election in 
early 1995.  This government remained in office until the elections in 1997 when it was 
replaced by a Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat coalition which remained in office to 
2007  being successfully re-elected in 2002.30 For the earlier part of this period there is 
little indication of a political budget cycle effect.  While the increases provided by the 
Rainbow coalition in the 1997, just before the election, were a significant increase on the 
previous year, they were less in real terms than the increase provided in the first Rainbow 
budget. 
 
Insert figure 3 & 4 
 
The major exceptions to this are the 2002 and 2007 elections.  These are perhaps the 
clearest examples of a political budget cycle which one could wish to find.  Spending in 
the early years of the 1997-2002 Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat government was at 
about the same level (as a percentage of GDP) as under the previous Rainbow 
government.  However expenditure rose significantly as the 2002 election approached.  
Immediately after the election the social welfare budget package dropped dramatically.  
This reduction led to the deferral of the implementation of several commitments such as 
increases in child benefit. The state of the public finances was put forward as the reason 
for the dramatic reduction in the additional expenditure on social security in the post-
election period.  It is, however, perhaps difficult to believe that the somewhat limited 
difficulties which arose in the public finances in 2003 were so wholly unknown one year 
                                                
30 Following the recent 2007 elections Fianna Fáil has returned to government in coalition with the Green 
Party and a much reduced Progressive Democrats. 
earlier as to justify the entirely different approach to social security expenditure post-
election . Subsequently, following poor election results for the government in the 2004 
local EU elections, social security spending increased substanntially again as the 2007 
election approached. 
 
The finding of a very clear budget cycle in the 2002 and 2007 elections is obviously not 
in line with Warin and Donahues (2006) conclusion that the Treaty of Maastricht and the 
constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact hindered a political budget cycle 
effect.31 Of course, a general trend as shown in comparative studies is not inconsistent 
with individual countries showing a contrary tendency and the exceptional state of the 
Irish economy in the period must be borne in mind. 
  
Conclusion 
 
In total we find that elections were the occasion for a significant pre-or post increase in 
the size of the social welfare budget package at 12 elections32 out of the 26 elections 
included in this study.33 However, of these, four related to a change in the party in power 
which was not subsequently followed by the evidence of a political budget cycle.34 It 
seems inappropriate to describe the implementation of different policies as evidence of a 
                                                
31 Although Mink and de Haan (2005) come to the opposite conclusion. 
32 These were 1932, 1944, 1948, 1951, 1965, 1969, 1973 (both pre-and post-), 1981 (twice), 1982, 2002 
and 2007. 
33 The elections of the first four Dails are excluded. The first three elections did not take place under normal 
circumstances.  While a more or less normal politics may have resumed by the 1923 election, there was 
little opportunity in this election for the development of a political budget cycle. 
34 In 1932, 1948, 1951 and 1973. 
political budget cycle.  In addition, it is difficult to categorise the 1965 election pattern as 
a political budget cycle.  
 
Our study does indicate that political budget cycles existed in relation to the Irish social 
security budget process in relation to eight of the elections studied (about one-third).35  
The first such occurrence is in 1944 when Fianna Fáil altered its previous approach and 
put much more emphasis on social policy expenditure (Cousins, 2003, 118-20). A clear 
but modest political budget cycle can be seen in relation to the two elections in 1969 and 
1973 - again under a Fianna Fáil government.  The political instability of the early 1980s 
appears to have given rise to political budget cycle effects in the three elections of 1981 
and 1982 under both Fianna Fáil and the Fine Gael-Labour coalition.  Finally, the 2002 
and 2007 elections provide perhaps the clearest examples of a political budget cycle in 
the period in question.  
 
From this study we can draw a number of conclusions: 
 
 1) Political budget cycles appear to be becoming somewhat more common (albeit not in 
any consistent manner) with the first political budget cycle not reported until 1944 but 
with political budget cycles repeated in each decade since the 1960s (except the 1990s) 
(table 2). 
 
Insert table 2 
                                                
35 Recall that an increase in the social security expenditure is apparent twice in the 1973 election: firstly a 
very modest political budget cycle effect before the election and, subsequently, a much more of a 
significant but noncyclical increase after the change of government in that election. 
 2) Political budget cycles appear to be more likely where there is a relatively little policy 
difference between the parties contesting for election for example in 1944 (Lee, 1989), 
2002 (Benoit and Laver, 2006) and 2007, and where the ruling party remains in office in 
the long-term (for example in 1944, 1969 and 1973, 2002 and 2007).36 
 
3) Non-cyclical increases are more likely where there is a change in the party of 
government for example in 1932-3 and in 1973-5 with the new party wishing to 
emphasise the difference in its policies.  Perhaps surprisingly however none of these 
parties then significantly increased the social welfare budget package in the run-up to the 
following election. 
 
4) Political budget cycles were, in all but one case, associated with Fianna Fáil or Fianna 
Fáil-led governments but given that, since 1927, a non-Fianna Fáil government has never 
been re-elected to office, relatively little significance can be attached to this finding.37 
However, political budget cycles are absent on a number of occasions when they might 
have been expected from Fianna Fáil, in particular 1948. 
 
We might suggest that the reason for these patterns is related to the difficulty which a 
party, which has been in power for a long period and which has relatively little 
                                                
36 Benoit and Lavers (2006) study of party positions in 2002 reports less difference between the two main 
Irish parties than is to be found in most other countries studied  a view confirmed by a national study of 
voter estimates (Benoit and Laver, 2005) and by Benoit and Lavers (2003) finding of little significant 
difference between the economic policy positions of the election manifestos of the three main parties. 
Unfortunately, however, there is no quantitative measure of party policy differences over time. 
37 Whether or not such governments might take this as an indicator that they should adopt a political budget 
cycle approach to enhance their prospects of re-election and/or speculation as to why they have not done so 
to date falls outside the scope of this paper. 
substantive policy difference from its main rival (and, in recent years, is affected by 
falling party identification (Marsh, 2006)), has in distinguishing its policies from those of 
its opposition. One option is perhaps to signal its competence through social and 
economic measures  such as increased welfare benefits.38 However, whether this is a 
credible long-term option (i.e. credible to the electorate) may be open to question.  The 
other (albeit exceptional) occasion where political budget cycles appear to have occurred 
was in the political instability of the early 1980s where parties seem to have been 
prepared to adopt this approach in a bid to gain political support. In contrast, increases in 
social spending for ideological reasons are more common in earlier decades (1932, 1948 
and 1973) and we do not appear to have seen a non-budget cycle increase in social 
spending (i.e. one reflecting differing party ideologies) since 1973. 
 
Finally, we must ask whether political budget cycles have succeeded in their apparent 
objective i.e. securing election for the relevant political party.  In fact, of the eight 
occasions on which we have identified a political budget cycle, the political party 
responsible for the apparent cycle was elected in four (all involving Fianna Fáil) and not 
elected in four cases.  In the 1944, 1969, 2002 and 2007 elections, when the political 
budget cycle were significant in size and integrated into Fianna Fáils overall electoral 
campaign we see a successful electoral outcome.  
 
While, of course, we do not know to what extent the political budget cycle was causally 
related to electoral success, this record contrasts with  Kraemers (1997) finding of very 
                                                
38 Superior competence was, for example, a major issue in the 2002 election campaign (Marsh and 
Kennedy, 2003) and also in 2007. 
limited impact for political budget cycles in a study of political budget cycles in Latin 
America. Kraemer  while finding significant evidence of such cycles found that they 
did not significantly increase the success rate of the re-election bid of the incumbent (p. 
28).39 If this is the case, one might wonder why a rational government would attempt to 
produce such a cycle. But, as Kraemer points out it may be political suicide for a 
government not to expand its pre-election budget as the electorate may interpret this as 
incompetence.40  
 
In conclusion, this paper suggests that political budget cycles can help to explain the 
recent pattern of social security expenditure increases in Ireland. Of course, one cannot 
simply generalize from this finding to other European countries which may have entirely 
different patterns. However, this study does suggest that further research into the impact 
of political budget cycles in other European countries would be on interest and would 
help to inform the broader debates in the political science literature about the impact of 
budget cycles. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
39 Conversely, however, and in an EU context, Mulas-Granados (2004) found strong evidence that 
governments responsible for fiscal adjustments were less likely to be re-elected (although this impact 
declined in the post-Maastricht period). 
40 It also contrast with Brender and Drazens (2006) conclusion, based on a  survey of 164 elections in 23 
developed countries, that increased financial deficits reduce the possibility that a leader is re-elected. 
However, due to the ongoing economic boom Irish politicians can adopt an expansionary fiscal policy 
without running deficits.  
References 
 
Akhmedov, A. and E. Zhuravskaya, 2004. Opportunistic political cycles: test in a young 
democracy setting Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), 1301-38. 
Alesina, A., G.D. Cohen and N. Roubini, 1991. Macroeconomic policy and elections in 
OECD democracies, NBER working paper 3830. 
Andrikopoulos, A., I. Loizides and K. Prodromidis, 2004. Fiscal policy and political 
business cycles in the EU European Journal of Political Economy 20 (1), 125-52. 
Asutay, M., 2004 .Searching for opportunistic political business cycles in Turkey, 
conference paper, European public choice society, Berlin. 
Benoit K. and M. Laver, 2003, Estimating Irish party policy positions using computer 
wordscoring: the 2002 Elections Irish Political Studies, 18(1), 97-107. 
Benoit K. and M. Laver, 2005 Mapping the Irish policy space: voter and party spaces in 
preferential elections Economic and Social review 36(2), 83-108. 
Benoit K. and M. Laver, 2006, Party policy in modern democracies. London: Routledge. 
Bew, P. and H. Patterson, 1982. Seán Lemass and the making of Modern Ireland 1945-
66, Dublin: Gill and MacMillan. 
Bittencourt, J. L. and R. O. Hilbrecht, 2002. Ciclo politico na economia Brasileria: um 
teste para a execuão orçamentária dos governos estaduais - 1983/2000, proceedings of 
the  XXXIst. Brazilian Economics Meeting. 
Brender, A.  and A. Drazen, 2004. Political budget cycles in new versus established 
democracies, NBER working paper 10539. 
Brender, A. and A. Drazen, 2006, Political Implications of Fiscal Performance in OECD 
Countries, in Franco, D., ed., Proceedings of the 8th International Public Finance 
Workshop, Banca dItalia. 
Bristow, J.A. and A.A. Tait, 1968 Economic Policy in Ireland, Dublin: IPA. 
Bruhn, K., 1996. Social spending and political support: the lessons of the national 
solidarity program in Mexico, Comparative Politics, 28 (2) 151-77.  
Buti, M. and P. Van De Noord, 2003. Discretionary fiscal policy and elections: the 
experience of the early years of EMU, OECD economics department working paper 351. 
Carty, R. K.  (1981) Brokerage and Partisanship: Politicians, Parties and Elections in 
Ireland Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 
Vol. 14, No. 1 53-81 
 
Cousins, M., 2003.  The birth of social welfare in Ireland, 1922-1952, Dublin: Four 
Courts Press. 
Dion, M., 2000.  The political economy of social spending: the Mexican solidarity 
programme, 1988-1994 Estudios Sociologicos, 18, 53, 000. 
Drazen, Allan, 2001. The political business cycle after 25 years NBER macroeconomics 
annual 2000, Cambridge : MIT Press. 
Ebbinghaus How the cases you choose limit the questions you ask paper presented at 
the European Consortium of Political Reserarch, Marburg. 
Eslava, M., 2005. Political budget cycles or voters as fiscal conservatives? Evidence 
from Colombia, working paper CEDE 2005-12. 
Gallagher, M. and M. Laver, 1993.  How Ireland voted 1992, Dublin: Folens. 
Gallagher, M., M. Marsh and P. Mitchell, How Ireland voted 2002. London: Palgrave. 
Galli, E. and S. Rossi, 2002. Political Budget Cycles: The case of the western German 
lander, Public Choice 110 (3-4) 283-303. 
Gonzales, M. De Los Angeles, 2002. Do changes in democracy affect the political 
budget cycle?  Evidence from Mexico Review of development economics, 6 (2), 204-
224.  
Hall, P.A. 2003, Aligning ontology and methodology in comparative research, in J. 
Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Harrison, M. and Michael Marsh, 1998. A re-examination of an Irish government 
popularity function Public Choice 94, 367-83. 
Komito, Lee. (1984) Irish Clientelism: A Reappraisal. The Economic and Social 
Review 15(3):173194 
Kraemer, M., 1997. Electoral Budget Cycles in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Incidence, Causes and Political Futility, Inter American Investment Bank, working paper 
WP-354. 
Kwon, H. Y., 2001. The politics of public spending in a developmental state: South 
Korea, 1987-1997 conference paper, Yale University. 
Laver, Michael, P. Mair and Richard Sinnott, 1987. How Ireland voted: the Irish general 
election 1987. Dublin: Poolbeg. 
Lee, Joseph, 1985, Ireland 1912-85. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Magaloni, B., A. Diaz-Cayeros and F. Estevez, 2003. The erosion of party hegemony, 
clientelism and portfolio diversification: The Programma Nacional de Solidaridad 
(Pronasol) in Mexico, working paper, Stanford University. 
Marsh, M. 2006, Anchoring a floating party system: party identification in Ireland, 
Electoral Studies, 25(3) 489-508. 
Marsh. Michael and F. Kennedy, 2003 Taking the credit and avoiding the blame: parties 
and voting behaviour in Ireland 2002. Paper presented at ECPR, Marburg, September. 
Medina, L. and D. Lema 2003. Ciclos presupuestarios de origin electoral: El caso de las 
provinces argentines procedings of the XXXVIIIth. annual meeting of the AAER. 
Mink, Mark and Jakob De Haan, 2005. Has the stability and growth pact impeded 
political budget cycles in the European Union? CESifo working paper 1532. 
Mulas-Granados, C., 2004. Voting against spending cuts: the electoral costs of fiscal 
adjustments in Europe European Union Politics 5(4) 467-93. 
O'Malley, Eoin and Matthew Kerby (2004)  Chronicle of a death foretold? 
understanding the decline of fine gael Irish Political Studies, Volume 19, Issue 1 , pages 
39  58 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, 1990. Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics, 
Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, 2002. Do electoral cycles differ across political systems?, 
IGIER working paper, Bocconi University. 
Puente, J. M. (2004) La economía political del gasto social en Venezuela revista del 
BCV, XVIII, 1. 
Remmer, K. L., 1993. The political economy of elections at Latin America, 1980-1991 
American Political Science Review, 87 (000) 393-407. 
Schady, N. R., 2000. The political economy of expenditures by the Peruvian social fund 
(FONCODES), 1991-95 American Political Science Review, 94, 289-304. 
Shalev, M. Limits of and Alternatives to Multiple Regression in Macro-Comparative 
Research Conference Paper, 2002. 
Shi, M. and J. Svensson, 2002a. Conditional Budget Cycles, CEPR discussion paper 
3352. 
Shi, M. and J. Svensson, 2002b. Political budget cycles in developed and developing 
countries, IIES working paper, Stockholm University. 
Shi, M. and J. Svensson, 2003. Political budget cycles: a review of recent 
developments, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 29(1), 67-76. 
Tujula, M. and G. Wolswijk, 2004. What determines fiscal balances? An empirical 
investigation in determinants of changes in OECD budget balances, ECB working paper 
422. 
Tutar,  I. and A. Tansel, 2000. Political Business Cycles, Institutional Structure and 
Budget Deficits in Turkey, Economic research forum working paper 2019, Middle East 
Technical University. 
Van Dalen, H. P. and O. H. Swank, 1995. Government spending cycles: ideological or 
opportunistic?  Erasmus University Rotterdam, research memorandum 9507. 
Von Hagen, J., 2003. Fiscal discipline and growth in Euroland: experiences with the 
stability and growth pact, ZEI working paper B06-2003. 
Warin, T. and K. Donahue The Stability and Growth Pact: a European answer to the 
political budget cycle? Middlebury College Economics Discussion Paper No. 06-06. 
Yarahuan, G. Pérez, 2003 Social programs and electoral competition: the political 
economy of the Mexican National Fund for Social Enterprises (1992-200) conference 
paper, Dallas. 
 
 
Table 1: Budget sizes (current year) in pre, post and non-election years, 1960-2007 
(% of GDP) 
 
   Pre   Post   Non 
1960-1972  0.26   0.26   0.14 
1973-1986  1.24   0.88   0.68 
1987-2007  0.51   0.26   0.42 
 
Average  0.67   0.47   0.41 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Political budget cycles and elections by decade, 1923-2007 
 
Elections  Political budget cycles 
 
1920s   2   0 
1930s   4   0 
1940s   3   1 
1950s   3   0 
1960s   3   1 
1970s   2   1 
1980s   5   3 
1990s   2   0 
2000s   2   2 
 
Total   26   8 
 
 
Appendix 1: Details of social security budgetary increases, 1924-2007 
 
Budget date Source SW Budget Increase 
 £ to 1992/ 1993-2007 
 
% of national 
income 
Election date 
 Dáil 
Debates 
 (vol., col.) 
Current 
Year 
Full Year Current 
Year 
Full 
Year 
 
      27 August 1923 
25 April 1924 7, 11 0 0    
22 April 1925 11, 9 0 0    
21 April 1926 15. 135 0 0    
21 April 1927 19, 1337 0 0    
      09 June 1927 
      15 September 1927 
25 April 1928 23, 344 0.175  0.109   
24 April 1929 29, 752 0 0    
30 April 1930 34, 1063 0 0    
06 May 1931 38, 753 0 0    
      16 February 1932  
change of government 
11 May 1932 41, 1489 0.35 0.58 0.241 0.399  
      24 January 1933 
10 May 1933 47, 734 0.45  0.321   
09 May 1934 52, 615 1.45  1.008   
15 May 1935 56, 851 0.25  0.168  
12 May 1936 62, 8 0 0    
14 April 1937 66, 735 0.2  0.001   
      01 July 1937 
12 May 1938 71, 875 0 0    
      17 June 1938 
10 May 1939 75, 1972 0 0    
08 November 1939 77, 957 0 0    
08 May 1940 80, 13 0 0    
07 May 1941 83, 21  0.816 0.418   
06 May 1942 86, 1613 0 0    
05 May 1943 89, 2265 0 0    
      23 June 1943 
03 May 1944 93, 2117 1.5 2.25 0.591 0.887  
      30 May 1944 
02 May 1945 97, 17 0 0    
08 May 1946 100, 2349 0 0    
07 May 1947 105, 2240 0 0    
15 October 1947 108, 393 0 0    
      04 February 1948  
change of government 
04 May 1948 110, 1037 0.6  0.188   
04 May 1949 115, 468 0 0    
03 May 1950 120, 1617 0 0    
02 May 1951 125, 1875 1.5     
      30 May 1951   change 
of government 
02 April 1952 130, 1113 3     
06 May 1953 138, 1176 0 0    
21 April 1954 145, 537 0 0    
      18 May 1954  change 
of government 
04 May 1955 150, 678 0.9 1.25 0.20 0.27  
08 May 1956 157, 19 0.3  0.07   
      05 March 1957  
change of government 
08 May 1957 161, 933 0 0    
23 April 1958 167, 599 0.883  0.18   
15 April 1959 Budget 
booklet 
0 0    
27 April 1960  0.61  0.10   
19 April 1961  0.60  0.09   
      09 October 1961 
10 April 1962  1.075  0.15   
23 April 1963  0.6  0.08   
14 April 1964  0.73  0.08   
      07 April 1965 
11 May 1965  3.22 5.7 0.33 0.59  
09 March 1966  0.25  0.02   
11 April 1967  2.12  0.19   
23 April 1968  3.12 5.52 0.25 0.44  
07 May 1969  7.41  0.51   
      18 June 1969 
22 April 1970  5.4 8.8 0.30 0.50  
28 April 1971  3.75  0.19   
19 April 1972  8.3 11.6 0.34 0.47  
      28 April 1973  
change of government 
16 May 1973  51 68.7 1.74 2.34  
03 April 1974  37.62 50.14 1.15 1.53  
15 January 1975  51.25 80.76 1.25 1.97  
26 June 1975  0 0    
28 January 1976  25.5  0.51   
26 January 1977  44.5  0.74   
      16 June 1977  change 
of government 
01 February 1978  21.7 33.2 0.31 0.47  
07 February 1979  39 50.4 0.47 0.61  
27 February 1980  95 126.4 0.96 1.28  
28 January 1981  144  1.21   
      11 June 1981  change 
of government 
21 July 1981  10.2 39 0.09 0.33  
27 January 1982  238.8  1.77   
      18 February 1982  
change of government 
25 March 1982  0.2  0   
      24 November 1982  
change of government 
09 February 1983  88.6  0.59   
25 January 1984  70.3 152 0.42 0.92  
30 January 1985  55.4 123 0.30 0.67  
29 January 1986  70.8  0.36   
       
  60  0.28  17 February 1987  
change of government 
31 March 1987  0  0.00   
27 January 1988  64.8 101 0.29 0.44  
25 January 1989  57.5 135 0.23 0.53  
      15 June 1989 
31 January 1990  78.6  0.28   
30 January 1991  62  0.21   
29 January 1992  85 162 0.27 0.51  
      25 November 1992 
24 February 1993  95.90  229.49 0.22 0.53  
26 January 1994  91.42 199.48 0.20 0.43  
8 February 1995  114.53 269.31 0.22 0.51 Change of government 
(without election) 
23 January 1996  101.59 204.55 0.18 0.35  
22 January 1997  144.53 272.60 0.22 0.41  
         06 June 1997  change 
of government 
2 December 1997  158.68 285.69 0.21 0.37  
2 December 1998  243.79 401.87 0.27 0.45  
1 December 1999  320.00 544.00 0.31 0.53  
6 December 2000  744.85 1,079.28 0.65 0.94  
5 December 2001  968.30 1,079.28 0.78 0.84  
        17 May 2002 
4 December 2002  500.68 530.00 0.37 0.39  
3 December 2003  607.90 630.00 0.41 0.42  
1 December 2004  834.15 874.00 0.61 0.64  
 6 December 2005  1065.00 1120.00 0.73 0.77  
7 December 2006  1322.00 1467.00 0.88 0.98 24 May 2007 
 
 
The table above sets out the principal data relied on in this analysis. Column 1 sets out 
the date of each Budget while column 2 provides the reference to the parliamentary 
debates setting out the details of the Budget. Since 1959 full details of the Budget are 
published in an annual Budget booklet. Columns 3 and 4set out the current and full year 
amounts of the social welfare budget packages in current values (£ to 18992 and E 
thereafter). As will be seen, only the current year amount is given in many of the earlier 
years although now - as the Budget year and calendar year are aligned - the full year 
value is more emphasised. Column 5 and 6 express this amount as a percentage of 
national income. For the period from 1970 a consistent series of estimates are available 
from the Central Statistics Office (www.cso.ie). As a significant divergence has 
developed between gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP) 
since the 1980s and as the later is usually considered a more reliable indicator of national 
income, I have used the GNP figures for the period from 1970 to 2007 (the GNP data for 
2006 and 2007 are estimates). For the earlier period I have used the gross domestic 
product published by the CSO since 1949 and earlier once-off estimates of national 
income (see Bristow and Tait, 1968). In general the national income figures are those for 
the year in which the Budget was announced. However, since December 1997, the annual 
Budget is announced in December of the previous year (so Budget 2007 was announced 
in December 2006) and I have used the GNP figures accordingly (i.e. the budget increase 
announced in December 2006 is shown as a % of 2007 GNP). Finally, Column 7 sets out 
the dates of each election and notes changes in government.  
 
 
I have expressed the social welfare budget package as a percentage of national income as 
the most reliable way of showing the scale of budget increases over time. An alternative 
would be to express the social welfare budget package as a % of government spending or 
of total social security expenditure (in view of shifts in the ratio of government spending 
to GNP over the period). However, this would not appear to affect the findings as there is 
no substantial variation between the social welfare budget package expressed as a % of 
GNP and as expressed as a % of total social security expenditure (at least for the more 
recent period for which consistent data is available) . For example for the period from 
198X to 2007, although there was a substantial variation in social security spending as a 
% of GNP over that period, the correlation between the social welfare budget package 
expressed as a % of GNP and as a % of total spending is 0.9X. Accordingly I have not 
included this alternative form of analysis in the main paper. A further alternative would 
be to express the social welfare budget package deflated by the cost-of-living. Again, I 
tested this approach - particularly in periods of high inflation - but it did not affect the 
findings reported here. 
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